If the School Rebuilding Programme (SRP) is the answer, just what was the question?
Announced in 2020 under the last Conservative government, the School Rebuilding Programme (SRP) is simply the latest in a line of large, flagship schemes, following Building Schools for the Future (BSF) (2003–2010) and the Priority School Building Programme (PSBP) (2011–2021).
Launched during the initial outbreak of Covid, the SRP was later identified as a vehicle to incorporate some of the RAAC-affected schools brought to light during the “crumbling schools” crisis in late 2023, just ahead of the change of government and the Labour administration taking power in July 2024.
Progress has, at best, been patchy. The reluctance to provide clear evidence let alone PR opportunities showcasing completed SRP projects, raises questions about the decision in 2025 to add a further 250 schools as part of the 10-year UK Infrastructure Strategy.
The response to a lack of visible progress appears to be a form of perpetuity defence: don’t focus on how many have been delivered, look instead at how many are on the list.
Whilst definitive completion figures remain unclear, we do have data on projects in progress or due to commence. This makes comparing progress and value for money with other capital funding routes such as Condition Improvement Fund (CIF) funding a more nuanced exercise.
What we can evidence is that, over its 10-year life, CIF has delivered in the region of 14,000 capital projects to academy trusts with fewer than 3,000 pupils on roll. For these schools, CIF is the sole route to funding of sufficient scale to address major compliance and condition issues that pose risks to life and continued school operation.
Unlike formulaic funding for larger MATs through the School Condition Allocation (SCA), CIF provides a clear record of project types and assurance that, under DfE output specifications, works meet defined quality and warranty standards. How SCA-funded MATs deploy capital funding across their estates is more opaque and subject to less scrutiny. Given the relative modesty of annual SCA allocations, it is understandable that these funds are often directed towards planned maintenance rather than major capital works, a challenge frequently addressed through strategic estates planning for academy trusts.
The CIF system operates through an annual bidding round and is typically oversubscribed three to four times over. It has long been viewed by schools and consultants as subject to so many variables that an element of luck inevitably remains, regardless of application quality or demonstrable need.
Of the 21,600 schools nationally, around 10,000 – predominantly primary schools – remain local authority maintained and receive SCA. Of the remainder, approximately 6,000 schools sit within academy trusts large enough to also receive SCA. The annual SCA pot is in the region of £1.8 billion.
The remaining 5,000 CIF-eligible schools, smaller MATs and stand-alone trusts, share approximately £500 million per annum in bid-based capital funding. This figure has remained broadly static over the 10-year life of the programme. Against a backdrop of inflation, the consequence has been a record low number of CIF awards, falling from a high point of over 2,000 projects to fewer than 900 in 2025.
It is self-evident that the least well-funded of the three capital routes is doing much of the heavy lifting, keeping schools safe, warm, dry and ultimately open.
CIF, by its nature as a competitive bidding model, is vulnerable to criticism because outcomes are binary: successful or unsuccessful. It is high risk and high reward. Winners can see their estates transformed; those who are unsuccessful feel frustrated and let down. The imbalance between the two reinforces the perception of a flawed model, and highlights why robust academy trust estates advisory services are increasingly relied upon to navigate risk and prioritisation.
Many bids are robust and entirely justified, but the volume means unsuccessful projects are often resubmitted in subsequent rounds, competing with both other previously unsuccessful schemes and entirely new applications. The flow of bids entering the system is not matched by those exiting it.
In that sense, the process risks becoming perpetual, not unlike how the SRP itself can appear.
